Third Party Beneficiary Arbitration Agreement

The court first concluded that Sutherland could impose arbitration proceedings as a party to the arbitration agreement under the simple terms of that agreement. Indeed, the arbitration agreement that was included in U-Verse`s terms of use provided that “you and AT-T agree to settle all claims between you and AT-T” and defined “AT-T” as a whole to include Thompson`s local telephone company AT-T (here, Illinois Bell Bell Telephone Company) as well as its “affiliates, agents, employees, predecessors in the interests, successors and assigned.” Given that AT-T in Discovery made it clear that the calls from “AT-T partners” had been sent to “customer contact numbers of persons” who had registered for U verses, the court found that Sutherland could assert the arbitration agreement as an “affiliate” of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company and therefore as a contracting party to the agreement. The Swiss Supreme Court reserved the judgment on the admissibility of the appeal for incompetence. Whether the discharge prayers can be made in favour of a third-party beneficiary is not only a matter of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, but it is the merits of the case.5 Even assuming that V.X. BV`s participation in arbitration had distorted the entire proceeding to the point of justifying the annulment of the final award, the Supreme Court of Switzerland upheld the opinion of the Court of Arbitration that the agreements confer on V.X. BV rights that it was authorized to apply (perfect contracts of third-party beneficiaries under the code of swiss obligations (“CO”) paragraph 2). Therefore, A.X. could not, in good faith, object, in good faith, to the Swiss judges to the fact that the beneficiary of such contractual obligations expresses his rights through the same dispute settlement mechanism agreed between the main contracting parties: ” […] It is not clear why the applicant who signed the agreements with the compromise clause could question the third-party beneficiary`s right to claim the prerogative arising from the agreements reached under the same procedural mechanism that he and the other contracting parties have taken to resolve the resulting disputes, namely arbitration.” The Court also recalled its consistent practice that, in the case of a so-called perfect third-party enterprise (Article 112, paragraph 2), in the case of a so-called “perfect” third-party company that did not enter into the contrary agreement of the parties, “the beneficiary […] as a debtor (or obligated) entitled to all the rights of prevalence and subsidiary rights, including the compromise clause,” 7. The challenge was therefore dismissed and the sentence was upheld. The case concerned an issue that is often heard in federal and federal courts, to what extent the courts should impose arbitration when the dispute concerns a party that has not signed the underlying agreement that contains the compromise clause. In the national context, courts will often pay attention under federal arbitration law to established contractual principles to decide whether arbitration should be imposed, taking into account, for example, whether the non-sponsor is a third party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement or whether the party should be prevented from opposing arbitration according to an estoppel theory. , an alter ego or a theory of the search for the veil.

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